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 ABSTRACT
In 2007, the European Commission and US govern-
ment signed an agreement liberalizing international 
air transportation between the two continents. It 
was expected to increase the annual number of pas-
sengers by up to 11 million and generate more than 
5 billion EUR in consumer surplus. However, in 2008 
the market was struck by global economic crisis. We 
use regression analysis to distinguish between posi-
tive impacts of liberalization and negative impacts 
of the crisis. We come to the conclusion that had the 
market not been reinforced by liberalization, annual 
transatlantic traffic would have shrunk at a pace 3-7 
million passengers faster. The results are a clear indica-
tion that if European and US airlines want to remain 
competitive in the coming era of Asian dominance, 
further liberalization efforts have to be undertaken. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
While international trade with the majority of commercial services was liberalized in 1995 when 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) entered into force, air transportation has re-
mained one of the most protectionist sectors of any country’s economy (Lipková, 2011). Almost 
70 years after the adoption of the Convention on International Civil Aviation in Chicago (1944) 
civil aviation relations between countries are still governed by this old document. Establishing 
direct flights from a point A in country X to a point B in country Y requires bilateral agreement 
between the countries. The agreement determines the number of flights permitted per week, sets 
frequency, capacity, aircraft type and price restrictions. Until recently, the US-EU aviation relations 
used to be no exception. 
The successful creation of common aviation market of the European Union in 1997 di-
rected the attention of the European Commission to international markets where USA was fol-
lowing its “divide and conquer strategy” (Zhang and Zhang, 2002) of signing separate bilateral 
agreements with EU member states. These discriminated airlines on the basis of their nationality 
and hence were in direct contradiction with the Treaty of Rome. A separate bilateral agreement 
between USA and France meant that only French and US-owned airlines were allowed to operate 
scheduled direct air services between USA and France. Analogically, a separate bilateral agreement 
between USA and Belgium meant that only Belgian and US-owned airlines were allowed to oper-
ate scheduled direct air services between USA and Belgium. As a result of this, the European Court 
of Justice decided in November 2002 that by entering into separate relations with USA EU mem-
ber states violated Community law. The European Commission therefore launched a campaign to 
negotiate a common agreement with USA. 
After four years of negotiations the US-EU Open Skies Agreement was signed in 2007 and 
entered into force on March 30th 2008. The agreement significantly liberalizes the North Atlantic 
market and includes the following most important measures: (Hasan, 2008)
•	 all US and EU-based airlines are allowed to operate flights between any point in the EU 
and any point in USA; 
•	 USA accepts the Community air carrier concept i.e. airlines owned by nationals of any EU 
member state have the same rights and obligations; 
•	 no capacity or frequency limits on North-Atlantic flights; 
•	 free pricing; 
•	 unlimited code-sharing for both sides; 
•	 alliances between US and EU airlines qualify for antitrust immunity.
The goal of this paper is to analyze impacts of the US-EU Open Skies Agreement on trans-
atlantic passenger flows and compare them to scientific predictions. We use simple linear regres-
sion models to distinguish between the positive impacts of liberalization and negative impacts of 
the global economic crisis 2008-2009.
II. THE US-EU OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT – GREAT EXPECTATIONS
Before adopting the US-EU Open Skies Agreement both parties had performed a series of analyses 
of its potential impacts. Major studies dealing with the topic include the Brattle report (Brattle 
Group, 2002), the Booz-Allen-Hamilton report (Bhadra and Schaufele, 2007), a paper by Robyn et 
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al (2005), Mayor and Tol (2007), Alford and Champley (2007), Peterson and Graham (2007) and 
a few others.
The first study analyzing potential impacts of the Agreement was the Brattle report, pre-
pared on behalf of the European Commission in 2002. It predicted the Agreement would lead to 
an annual increase in the number of transatlantic passengers by 4-11 million and to a total in-
crease in the number of intra-EU passengers by 13-36 million over a period of five years. Moreover, 
lower operating costs of airlines would lead to lower prices, increased travel and an annual con-
sumer surplus of 5.2 billion EUR. On the supply side, annual economic output of directly related 
industries was expected to grow by 3.6 to 8.1 billion EUR. Also, a creation of 4,800 to 16,300 jobs 
was predicted, evenly distributed between the EU and USA.
In 2007 the European Commission commissioned Booz Allen Hamilton consulting com-
pany to compile a new report. Using the same methodology as the Brattle report and adjusting it 
to new conditions in the world economy, it intended to predict impacts of the Open Skies Agree-
ment for a period of 5 years after its adoption. It approximated the increase in transatlantic travel 
to 26 million, i.e. 50 per cent compared to the base year. Other predictions included consumer 
surplus ranging from 6.4 to 12.0 billion EUR, creation of 20,000 new direct jobs and further 50,000 
more indirect jobs. In general, the Booz-Allen-Hamilton report’s predictions were considerably 
more optimistic compared to the Brattle report. This could be attributed to the boom in air travel 
that superseded previous pessimism fueled by dot.com crisis and 9-11 attacks. Furthermore, while 
the Brattle report was based on the 15-member EU, the Booz-Allen-Hamilton model already took 
into account the enlarged EU counting 25 member states. Aviation markets of the newcomers 
were less developed and hence their growth potential was higher.
TABLE 1. ESTIMATES OF THE US-EU OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT IMPACTS
Brattle lower Booz Allen Hamilton Robyn et al
Annual transatlantic pas-
senger growth
4.1 million 5.2 million 11.0 million
Annual EU passenger 
growth
13.6 million - 35.7 million
Annual economic output 
growth
3.6 billion - 8.1 billion
Consumer surplus 5.1 billion 1.3-2.4 billion 5.2 billion
New jobs 4,800 22,000 16,300
Source: Brattle Group (2002), Robyn et al (2005), Bhadra and Schaufele (2007)
Other significant studies analyzing potential impacts of the Open Skies Agreement include 
Dorothy Robyn’s article published in 2005 (Robyn et al, 2005). Robyn was a member of the original 
Brattle report group and she further elaborated the upper-case scenario. She believed the improv-
ing state of the global economy and EU enlargement allowed for higher-than-previously-expected 
predictions. Moreover, one of the crucial Brattle report assumptions was a stable 1 USD to 1 EUR 
exchange rate, which – at the time of Robyn´s study – was far from reality. Estimates of the three 
most commonly cited reports are shown in table 1.
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On the other side of the debate, Mayor and Tol (2008) argued previous studies were too optimistic 
and a more realistic estimate of total passenger growth would be somewhere between 1 and 14 
per cent, depending on the magnitude of price reductions.
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The majority of studies applying linear regression models to analyze changes in air traffic use an-
nual GDP growth rate as a single predictor variable. The practice is related to air transportation 
being a luxurious good with direct elasticity of demand ranging from 1.5 to 2.5 (see for example 
Intervistas, 2007 and Doganis, 2006). After having performed more than twenty regression analy-
ses with various predictor variables (such as volume of exports, imports, foreign direct investment, 
USD/EUR exchange rate etc.) we come to the conclusion that apart from annual GDP growth rate 
another suitable predictor variable for analyzing North Atlantic air traffic is average annual unem-
ployment rate. Consequently, we use the following four models:
∆Pax = a + b1∆GDP_US + b2∆GDP_EU + b3U_US + b4U_EU + e                                        (1)
∆Pax = a + b1∆GDP_US + b3U_US + b4U_EU + e                                                                 (2)
∆Pax = a + b1∆GDP_US + e                                                                                                     (3)
Pax = a + b3U_US + e                                                                                                               (4) 
 
∆Pax = annual growth of traffic
Pax  = annual number of passengers
∆GDP_US = annual GDP growth rate in USA
∆GDP_EU  = annual GDP growth rate in the EU
U_US  = average annual unemployment rate in USA
U_EU  = average annual unemployment rate in EU
e  = random variable
a  = intercept
b1 – b4  = regression parameters
The main goal of our research was to explain the largest possible fraction of variance in 
the number of North Atlantic passengers with the help of the fewest possible predictor variables. 
Therefore, the models we use are relatively simple. Using annual GDP growth rate instead of GDP 
per capita we minimize the risk of heteroskedasticity. However, similar approach is not suitable for 
unemployment data, where a risk of heteroskedasticity exists.
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Regression models 1, 2 and 3 are based on 2000-2007 data. US-EU aviation relations in this period 
were governed by a wide array of bilateral agreements, most of them of a relatively protectionist 
nature. The dataset accounts for impacts of the dot.com crisis and terrorist attacks of 9-11. Re-
gression model 4 is based on the data from crisis years 2000-2002. Except for model 4 which uses 
monthly data, all other models are based on average annual data.
The sources of data we used for regression analysis include Eurostat and US Department of Trans-
portation Statistics. Annual GDP growth rates and unemployment rates are based on Eurostat 
data. Annual unemployment rate data were calculated by author from Eurostat monthly aver-
age unemployment rate data using a simple geometric average. Transatlantic traffic data was ex-
tracted from the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 International Segment (all carriers) 
database, which is published with a 6-month delay. We processed this data using 12-month simple 
moving average method to adjust for seasonal variation.
TABLE 2. DATA SOURCES FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Data source
GDP growth rate EUROSTAT: Real GDP growth rate. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
Unemployment rate
EUROSTAT: Unemployment rate, monthly average, by sex and age groups. Avail-
able at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
Number of passengers
US DOT Bureau of Transportation Statistics: T-100 International segment (all carri-
ers). Available at: http://www.transtats.bts.gov.
Source: Own elaboration
After testing the quality of models, we applied them to 2008-2011 data in order to de-
termine positive effects of the US-EU Open Skies Agreement and separate them from negative 
impacts of the global economic crisis.
IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
All the models used have high correlation coefficients and coefficients of determination, indicat-
ing good fits. The predictor variables explain a high proportion of variance in the number of North 
Atlantic passengers. F statistics of all the models is also statistically highly significant which further 
implies high degree of goodness of fit (table 3). 
Model 1 has the highest coefficient of determination. However, although it is statistically 
highly significant, the problem lies in the P-value of intercept and parameters, only one of them 
(∆GDP_US) being statistically significant. That indicates unsuitability of the model to predict 
number of passengers. An interesting feature of this model is the positive value of parameter U_
US. This means higher unemployment rate in USA should lead to increased number of North 
Atlantic passengers, which contravenes economic logic.
With the exception of intercept all the parameters of model 2 are statistically significant. 
The model only differs from model 1 in that it does not include EU GDP growth rate. It can there-
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fore be claimed that while the number of North Atlantic passengers depends directly on the GDP 
growth rate in USA, the GDP growth rate in the EU plays no statistically significant role. This claim 
was independently confirmed by the Booz-Allen-Hamilton report, using a different approach and 
different dataset, but effectively coming to the same conclusion (Bhadra and Schaufele, 2007).
TABLE 3. REGRESSION STATISTICS AND PARAMETERS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Multiple R 0.989426 0.989287 0.904694 0.959463
R Square 0.978963 0.978689 0.818472 0.920569
Adjusted  
R Square
0.950914 0.962706 0.788217 0.918233
Standard Error 1.602639 1.396920 3.328894 44,237.35





16.85005 (0.079910) -15.3054 (0.004697) 2,714,161 (0.000001)
∆GDP_US   
(P-Value)
8.286673 (0.013335) 8.559547 (0.000199) 6.591456 (0.002012) -
∆GDP_EU  
(P-Value)
0.547813 (0.856056) - - -
U_US  
(P-Value)
3.962990 (0.212333) 3.527063 (0.027482) - -182,249 (0.000001)
U_EU  
(P-Value)
-6.158470 (0.050438) -6.434600 (0.005411) - -
Source: Own calculations
Model 2 has the same peculiarity as model 1, suggesting high unemployment rate in USA 
leads to high number of passengers; however, unlike with model 1, both parameters are now statis-
tically significant. This counterintuitive claim can only be explained with possible partial collinear-
ity between unemployment rate and GDP growth rate in USA. 
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Models 3 and 4 are very simple, each of them taking into account only one predictor variable. Both 
are statistically highly significant and their intercepts and parameters are statistically significant as 
well.
Model 3 shows a high level of correlation between GDP growth rate in USA and the num-
ber of passengers. This finding is reinforced by general knowledge of economic theory – air trans-
port is a luxury good and as such it is consumed proportionally to the rising level of income. If the 
growth rate falls below certain level (in this case 2.3 per cent) the consumption of goods starts to 
decrease. According to model 3, in case of stagnant US economy the number of passengers on the 
North Atlantic market will shrink by 5 per cent. This result is in line with the latest research in air 
travel demand elasticity (see Intervistas, 2007 and Doganis, 2006).
While models 1-3 are based on annual data 2001-2007, model 4 is based on monthly US 
unemployment data from crisis years 2000-2002. The model and its parameters are statistically 
highly significant. Negative value of the U_US parameter meets our expectations of passenger 
growth being negatively correlated to unemployment rate.
Regression analysis results in these equations:
∆Pax = 1.695 + 8.287∆GDP_US + 0.548∆GDP_EU + 3.963U_US + 6.158U_EU + e
∆Pax = 16.850 + 8.560∆GDP_US + 3.527U_US + 6.435U_EU + e
∆Pax = -15.305 + 6.591∆GDP_US + e
Pax = 2,714,161 + 182,249U_US + e
Applying equations 5-8 to data from years 2008-2011 and comparing model values with 
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TABLE 4. NORTH ATLANTIC PASSENGER TRAFFIC 2005-2010 – REALITY VS. MODELS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
2005 23,656,386 23,027,691 23,383,873 23,775,926
2006 24,283,654 23,988,803 24,319,112 24,245,795
2007 25,187,187 23,211,891 25,019,187 23,608,174
2008 25,151,600 19,548,792 22,397,694 20,834,129
2009 23,338,509 13,093,346 16,350,886 16,162,694
2010 23,326,404 22,741,788 25,071,707 23,458,493
2011 24,222,303 22,290,503 23,655,038 22,523,796
Source: Own calculations
It is obvious that the real number of North Atlantic passengers in years 2008 and 2009 was much 
higher than our models would have expected. The difference between predicted and real values 
for the crisis years reached 11-22 per cent in 2008 and 30-47 per cent in 2009. In 2010, when the 
GDP growth in USA as well as in the EU rebounded, the difference decreased to 3-7 per cent and 
in 2011 to 2-8 per cent (both with the exception of model 4).
The worst performer from among models used is model 4 – its predictions of 12 million 
passengers in 2009 and 13 million in 2011 are significantly underestimated. As a result, unemploy-
ment rate in USA does not seem to be a good predictor variable for number of passengers and 
therefore we will omit this model from further analysis.
We have already shown that model 1 as a whole is statistically highly significant, but its 
parameters are not. Conversely, regression statistics values of models 2 and 3 are acceptable and 
the models seem to have a high degree of goodness of fit. Therefore, after a thorough analysis of 
the regression statistics and model parameters we come to the conclusion that the best predic-
tions are offered by models 2 and 3. According to these models the number of passengers on the 
North Atlantic market in 2009 should have been approximately 7 million lower than it really was. 
Assuming our models are correct, these 7 million passengers can be interpreted as direct impact 
of the US-EU Open Skies Agreement.
The difference between modeled and actual number of passengers is similar to the impact 
predicted by middle scenario of the Booz-Allen-Hamilton report. This leads us to believe our mod-
els are suitable and their performance when adjusted for impacts of the global economic crisis are 
correct. Additional factor supporting our hypothesis is the North Atlantic traffic in 2010. 2010 
was a year of renewed growth in USA as well as in the European Union, with GDP rising 2.4 and 2.1 
per cent. This was in line with average GDP growth in the first years of the 21st century. However, 
the world did not exit the crisis yet and neither did civil aviation. Actual number of North Atlantic 
passengers in 2010 fell to 23 million, a net loss of 2 million passengers compared to 2007. Applying 
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models 2 and 3 to 2010 data we can see they provide a very good fit. This means positive effects 
of liberalization were approximately equal to negative impacts of the subsiding global economic 
crisis, a very believable scenario supported by IATA year-end traffic data.
V. DISCUSSION
Our approach is not free of problems. First, a typical problem of linear regression models is their 
inability to identify all predictor variables that influence the response variable. This is especially 
the case in today’s globalized world characterized by increasing velocity of internationalization 
processes, where it is almost impossible to meet the ceteris paribus assumption. Second, even 
though we used a 12-month moving average method to minimize distortions caused by short-
term external shocks, regression analysis is not really able to recognize and reflect new conditions 
in the world economy. We can claim with utmost certainty that the global economic crisis 2008-
2009 changed the conditions on the North Atlantic aviation market and hence decreased the suit-
ability of regression models based on pre-crisis data. Unfortunately, quantifying the magnitude of 
this change is at present time impossible. However, judging from statements of top-level managers 
of large international airlines, it is clear the crisis has led to a permanent rise of income elasticity 
of demand for business class travel, shift of a part of business passengers to economy class as 
well as increase of the overall importance of air tariffs for passengers´ decision-making. Moreover, 
it seems obvious that the second wave of crisis is coming and has already started affecting the 
North-Atlantic market.
We believe it is reasonable to claim that the US-EU Open Skies Agreement has had a significant 
positive impact on the number of North-Atlantic passengers. However, as the models used admit-
tedly have some minor flaws, we think the result obtained, i.e. 7 million passengers, is overestimat-
ed. A much more realistic estimate seems to be 3 million, as predicted by Booz-Allen-Hamilton’s 
lower scenario. The difference could be explained by changed economic conditions and general 
decrease of air tariffs triggered by the crisis.
From Croatian point of view, the US-EU Open Skies Agreement set a framework allowing 
all American and European airlines to operate direct flights between any American and Euro-
pean airports. While there is currently no such service from Croatia, some new EU-member states 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Latvia etc.) have direct flights to USA. In the future the Agree-
ment could play a vital role in launching direct flights between USA and Croatia, especially taking 
into account new aircraft models specifically designed for thin routes (Boeing 787 Dreamliner and 
Airbus A350) and potential entry of low-cost carriers into the North Atlantic market. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The US-EU Open Skies Agreement´s entry into force in 2008 was attended by expectations of 
significant rise in the number of North-Atlantic passengers. Annual contribution of liberalization 
was expected to reach 4-11 million passengers and even the most conservative forecasts approxi-
mated the size of the market in 2009 to no less than 30 million. The global economic crisis 2008-
2009 made all the predictions useless sheets of paper – compared to 2007 the 2009 volume of 
the market shrank by 1.8 million passengers or 7.9 per cent, reaching only 23.34 million. In 2010 it 
decreased even further to 23.32 million.
On the basis of our regression analysis we come to the conclusion that despite crisis-relat-
ed negative trend in the number of passengers, importance of the US-EU Open Skies Agreement 
is undisputable. Had the North Atlantic market still been divided into separate bilateral US-EU 
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country markets, the 2009 volume of traffic would have been lower by 7 million passengers. This 
number might be overestimated due to lower air tariffs and unidentified long-term structural 
changes to the market caused by the global crisis. A more conservative estimate of impacts of the 
Agreement is 3 million passengers in 2009. These results are in accord with one of the most-widely 
cited pessimistic scenario of impacts of the Agreement prepared by Booz-Allen-Hamilton (see 
Bhadra and Schaufele, 2007).
The Agreement and its economic impacts, having passed only four years from its adoption, 
will be a very important topic of research in the coming years. It will be interesting to observe its 
performance after the crisis is finally over and compare it with the pre-crisis forecasts. Obviously 
the most challenging task will be to identify and quantify impacts of qualitative changes trig-
gered by the crisis. The results of such research will be crucial for long-term profitability of airlines 
and might finally settle the seemingly never-ending academic debate between supporters of pro-
tectionism and liberalism in air transportation. For now, it seems European and US airlines can 
successfully compete with their Asian and Middle-Eastern counterparts only if European and US 
governments increase their liberalization efforts. Then, if North-Atlantic air transport liberaliza-
tion becomes a story of success, liberalization in other corners of the world will surely follow suit.
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USPOREDBA PERFORMANSI NEURONSKIH MREŽA PRI 
PREDVIĐANJU PROPASTI BANAKA I STROJEVA S POTPORNIM 
VEKTORIMA: SLUČAJ TURSKE
SAŽETAK
Iskustvo stečeno u bankarskoj krizi u posljednja dva desetljeća upućuje na potrebu korištenja na-
prednih modela predviđanja u svrhu prevencije propasti banaka. Ovaj rad uspoređuje sposobnost 
umjetnih neuronskih mreža i strojeva s potpornim vektorima da predvide propast banaka. Iako se 
umjetne neuronske mreže često koriste za složene probleme u poslovanju, literatura koja spomin-
je strojeve s potpornim vektorima je relativno malobrojna a njihova sposobnost predviđanja pro-
pasti banaka nije previše poznata. U ovom radu su ove dvije inteligentne tehnike primijenjene na 
sklop podataka turskih komercijalnih banaka. Empirijski rezultati pokazuju da iako se predviđanje 
dvaju modela može smatrati zadovoljavajućim, neuronske mreže pokazuju nešto bolju sposob-
nost predviđanja od strojeva s potpornim vektorima. Osim toga, različite vrste grešaka u svakom 
modelu također ukazuju na to da su modeli s neuronskim mrežama bolji prediktori.
Ključne riječi: propast banaka, ANN (umjetne neuronske mreže), SVM (strojevi s potpornim vek-
torima), Turska
